2019上半年翻譯資格考試中級(jí)筆譯沖刺試題十

英譯漢

The U. S. -Europe Divide

President Bush is making a noble effort to1 pull together the fraying alliance, but the fact is Europeans and Americans no longer share a common view of the world. On the all-important2 question of power - the utility of power, the morality of power - they have parted ways.3 Europeans believe they are moving beyond power into a self_contained4 world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. Europe itself has entered a post-historical paradise, the realization of Immanuel Kant's'5 "Perpetual Peace." The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian6 world where international rules are unreliable and where security and the promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might.7 This is why, on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: 8 They agree on little and understand one another less and less.

Why the divergent perspectives? They are not deeply rooted in national character. Two centuries ago American statesmen appealed to international law and disdained "power politics", while European statesmen spoke of raison d'etat. Europeans marched off to World War I believing in power and martial glory, while Americans talked of arbitration treaties. Now the roles have reversed.

Part of the reason is the enormous shift in the balance of power. The gap between the United States and Europe opened wide as a result of World War n and has grown wider in the past decade. America's unparalleled military strength has predictably given it a greater propensity9 to use force and a more confident belief in the moral legitimacy of power. Europe's relative weakness has produced an aversion to force as a tool of international relations. Europeans today, like Americans 200 years ago, seek a world where strength doesn't matter so much, where unilateral action by powerful nations is forbidden, where all nations regardless of their strength are protected by commonly agreed rules of behavior. 10 For many Europeans, progress toward such a world is more important than eliminating the threat posed by Saddam Hussein. For Americans, the Hobbesian world is not so frightening. Unilateralism is naturally more attractive to those with the capacity to act unilaterally. And international law constrains strong nations more than it does the weak. Because of the disparity of power, Americans and Europeans even view 11 threats differently. A person armed only with a knife may decide that a bear prowling the forest is a tolerable danger - trying to kill the bear is riskier than lying low and hoping the bear never attacks. But a person with a rifle will likely make a different calculation: Why should he risk being mauled to death if he doesn't need to? Americans could imagine successfully invading Iraq and toppling Saddam, and therefore more than 70 percent of Americans favored that action.

Europeans, not surprisingly, found it unimaginable and frightening.

But it is not just the power gap that divides Americans and Europeans today. Europe's relatively pacific strategic culture is also the product of its war-like past. The European Union is a monument to Europe's rejection of the old power politics. Who knows the dangers of Machtpolitik better than a French or German citizen? As the British diplomat Robert Cooper recently noted, Europe today lives in a "postmodern system" that does not rest on12 a balance of power but on "the rejection of force" and on " self-enforced rules of behavior. " Raison d'etat has been "replaced by a moral consciousness." American realists may scoff, but within the confines of Europe the brutal laws of power politics really have been repealed. Since World War II European society has been shaped not by the traditional exercise of power but by the unfolding of a geopolitical miracle: The German lion has lain down with13 the French lamb. The new Europe has succeeded not by balancing power but by transcending power. And now Europeans have become evangelists for their "postmodern" gospel of international relations. The application of the European miracle to the rest of the world has become Europe's new mission.

This has put Europeans and Americans on a collision course. Americans have not lived the European miracle. They have no experience of promoting14 ideals and order successfully without power. Their memory of the past 50 years is of a Cold War struggle that was eventually won by strength and determination, not by the spontaneous triumph of "moral consciousness. 15 As good children of the Enlightenment, Americans believe in human perfectibility. But Americans from Donald Rumsfeld to Madeleine Albright also believe that global security and a liberal order depend on the United States — that "indispensable nation" - wielding its power in the dangerous, Hobbesian world that still flourishes, at least outside Europe.

There is no sure cure16 for this transatlantic divergence. Those on both sides of the Atlantic who implore Europe to increase its military capabilities are right - though a Europe that has so little belief in power is unlikely to spend the money to get more of it. Those who ask Americans to show some generosity of spirit, what the Founders called "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," are also right. The United States should honor multilateralism and the rule of law when it can, and try to build some international political capital for those times when unilateral action is unavoidable. But even if it does, will Europeans show the necessary tolerance for American power?

詞匯

1.fray磨損，摩擦

2.mire陷入

3.anarchic無政府主義的

4.liberal自由主義的

5.raison d'etat [法] (=reason of state)國

家至上主義，國家利益

6.arbitration仲裁，公斷

7.propensity傾向

8.aversion厭惡

9.disparity不一致，相異

10.maul傷害，毆傷

11.topple顛覆，推翻

12.Machtpolitik [德]強(qiáng)權(quán)政治，霸權(quán)政治

13.scoff嘲弄，嘲笑

14. repeal廢除，撤銷

15.collision碰撞，沖突

注釋

1.making a noble effort可譯作“竭力”。

2.all-important可譯作“至關(guān)重要的”。

3.they have parted ways根據(jù)語境可譯作“分道揚(yáng)鑣”。

4.self-contained原意為“自治的、自足的”，此處可引申為“完備的”。

5.以馬內(nèi)利·康德(1724-1804)，德國哲學(xué)家，他對(duì)哲學(xué)的貢獻(xiàn)在于主張哥白尼革命( Copemican Revolution).

6.霍布斯哲學(xué)：霍布斯是近代科學(xué)與政治學(xué)的重要奠基者。他和培根、伽利略與笛卞爾處同一時(shí)代，徹底批判了中世紀(jì)經(jīng)院哲學(xué)與古典哲學(xué)，使學(xué)術(shù)發(fā)展從中世紀(jì)邁向近代。不過，在同時(shí)代的人中，只有他企圖建構(gòu)一套全面的哲學(xué)理論，用來闡釋自然科學(xué)、政治科學(xué)及科學(xué)方法論。

7.本句是一個(gè)定語從句，其中where international rules are unreliable和where security and the promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might同時(shí)限定先行詞Hobbesian world，這兩部分屬并列關(guān)系，由于它們所表達(dá)的交際信息是狀語功能，故可譯作“因?yàn)?hellip;…”。

8.本句可轉(zhuǎn)譯為“在當(dāng)今重大戰(zhàn)略和國際問題上美國與歐洲的立場相去甚遠(yuǎn)”。

9.given it a greater propensity可轉(zhuǎn)譯為“更加喜好”。

10.本句是一個(gè)復(fù)雜的非限定性定語從句，三個(gè)限定性分句屬并列關(guān)系，翻譯時(shí)宜根據(jù)漢語表達(dá)習(xí)慣拆開來譯。

11.view原為動(dòng)詞，此處根據(jù)語境可轉(zhuǎn)換為名詞，譯作“對(duì)……的看法”。

12.rest on原意為“躺在……上;依靠”，此處可轉(zhuǎn)譯為“基于”。

13.lain down with此處可理解為“和平共處”。

14.原意為“促進(jìn)、發(fā)揚(yáng)”，這里由于其后動(dòng)賓搭配關(guān)系，可分別譯作“傳播理想”、“維護(hù)秩序”。

15.本句是一個(gè)定語從句，由于限定成分較長，不宜譯作前置定語，可按照漢語表達(dá)習(xí)慣拆開來譯：“他們對(duì)于過去50年的記憶只是一場冷戰(zhàn)，他們靠力量和意志而不是靠人類內(nèi)在的‘道德良知’最終贏得了這場戰(zhàn)爭”。

16.原意為“治療”，此處可轉(zhuǎn)譯為“靈丹妙藥”。

參考譯文

歐美的分歧

布什總統(tǒng)正竭力將摩擦不斷的聯(lián)盟扯到一起，然而事實(shí)上歐美已經(jīng)不再擁有共同的世界觀。在至關(guān)重要的權(quán)力問題上，如對(duì)權(quán)力的使用及權(quán)力的道義性的看法上，他們已經(jīng)分道揚(yáng)鑣。歐洲人堅(jiān)信，他們已超越權(quán)力的境界，進(jìn)入一個(gè)依靠法治、談判與合作的完備的世界。

歐洲已步入后歷史時(shí)代的天堂，實(shí)現(xiàn)了以馬內(nèi)利·康德所說的“永久的和平”。而與此同時(shí)，美國依然陷于歷史的困境中，在無政府主義的霍布斯哲學(xué)的世界里施展著權(quán)力，因?yàn)樵谶@個(gè)世界上國際準(zhǔn)則并不可靠，還需要用軍事力量去維護(hù)安全和自由秩序。所以在當(dāng)今重大戰(zhàn)略和國際問題上美國與歐洲的立場相去甚遠(yuǎn)。他們少有共識(shí)，雙方越來越缺乏理解。

為什么美國和歐洲的立場會(huì)背道而馳呢?這并非深深植根于民族性格之中。兩百年前，美國的政治家們求助于國際法，對(duì)抗強(qiáng)權(quán)政治，而他們的歐洲同事們卻在談?wù)搰依?。?dāng)初，崇尚武力的歐洲人昂首進(jìn)入第一次世界大戰(zhàn)，而美國人卻高喊調(diào)停，訂立和約。如今，時(shí)移事易，他們的角色正好顛倒了過來。

這種角色的顛倒，部分是由于力量平衡的顛倒所致。二戰(zhàn)后，美、歐實(shí)力差距不斷拉大，過去十年尤甚。毫無疑問，美國無可匹敵的軍事力量很自然地使它更喜好訴諸武力，更相信使用武力的道德合法性。歐洲相對(duì)弱小，因此，反感將武力當(dāng)作國際關(guān)系的工具。，今天的歐洲人和200年前的美國人一樣，正在致力于削弱武力在世界上的重要性，遏制強(qiáng)國的單邊行為，并用公認(rèn)的行為準(zhǔn)則保護(hù)包括弱小國家在內(nèi)的所有國家。許多歐洲人認(rèn)為，這種進(jìn)步遠(yuǎn)比根除薩達(dá)姆·候賽因造成的威脅重要的多。而美國人則認(rèn)為，霍布斯的世界并沒有如此可怕。自然，單邊主義對(duì)于那些有能力采取單邊行動(dòng)的國家更具吸引力，因而，國際法對(duì)強(qiáng)國的限制要大于弱國。這種力量上的差異，甚至使美、歐對(duì)外來威脅也持有不同的看法。

手里只有一把小刀的人會(huì)把一頭在森林里徘徊覓食的熊視作可以容忍的危險(xiǎn)一一因?yàn)闅⑺佬芤忍稍诘厣希矶\它不要襲擊自己更加危險(xiǎn)。但是，手持鋼槍的人就可能不這么看：既然他不必冒死躺下，那么有什么必要這樣做呢?美國人覺得自己可以成功入侵伊拉克并推翻薩達(dá)姆·候賽因政權(quán)，因此超過70%的美國民眾贊成這個(gè)行動(dòng)。自然，歐洲人覺得這種行動(dòng)難以想象，非常可怕。

但是當(dāng)今關(guān)、歐的分歧并不完全是由于力量的懸殊所致。歐洲相對(duì)溫和的戰(zhàn)略跟它以前的好戰(zhàn)經(jīng)歷也不無關(guān)系。歐盟的成立標(biāo)志著歐洲唾棄了舊時(shí)的強(qiáng)權(quán)政治。有誰比法國人和德國人更清楚強(qiáng)權(quán)政治的危險(xiǎn)?正如英國外交官羅伯特·庫伯新近指出的，當(dāng)今的歐洲處于一種“后現(xiàn)代體制”之中，這個(gè)體制不是基于力量的平衡，而是基于“對(duì)武力的唾棄”和“自覺執(zhí)行的行為準(zhǔn)則”。對(duì)他們而言，強(qiáng)權(quán)政治的合理性已經(jīng)為道德良知所取代。

盡管美國的現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者會(huì)對(duì)此嗤之以鼻，然而在歐洲，強(qiáng)權(quán)政治的殘酷準(zhǔn)則確實(shí)已被廢止。二戰(zhàn)以來，塑造了歐洲社會(huì)的不是訴諸武力的傳統(tǒng)，而是正在展開的地緣政治奇跡：德國雄獅和法國羔羊已經(jīng)和平共處。新歐洲不是通過力量平衡，而是通過超越力量，獲得了成功。如今的歐洲人已成為“后現(xiàn)代”國際關(guān)系福音書的傳播者。把歐洲的奇跡推廣到世界其他地區(qū)已成為歐洲的新使命。

這一點(diǎn)把歐洲和美國推上了沖突的道路。美國人沒有經(jīng)歷過歐洲的奇跡，也沒有不靠武力傳播理想、維護(hù)秩序的成功經(jīng)驗(yàn)。他們對(duì)于過去50年的記憶只是一場冷戰(zhàn)，他們靠力量和意志而不是靠人類內(nèi)在的“道德良知”最終贏得了這場戰(zhàn)爭。美國人深受啟蒙運(yùn)動(dòng)的影響，篤信人性的完美。然而，包括唐納德·拉姆斯菲爾德和瑪?shù)铝?middot;奧爾布賴特在內(nèi)的一些人仍堅(jiān)信全球安全與自由秩序有賴于美國這個(gè)“不可缺少的國家”在至少是歐洲以外的充滿危險(xiǎn)的霍布斯世界里展示力量。

沒有什么靈丹妙藥可以消彌大西洋兩岸之間的分歧。大西洋兩岸那些呼吁歐洲擴(kuò)充軍力的人是正確的——盡管對(duì)武力不以為然的歐洲不會(huì)花錢這樣做。那些奉勸美國大度一點(diǎn)——即展示美國國父們所說的“充分尊重人類意見”的精神——的人也沒有錯(cuò)。美國應(yīng)當(dāng)盡可能尊重多邊主義和法治努力為那些不可避免的單邊行為賺取政治資本。然而，即便如此，歐洲人對(duì)美國的權(quán)威會(huì)表現(xiàn)出必要的容忍嗎?

練習(xí)

1.As we consider our investment strategies about systems, which are usually fielded for twenty years or more, we have to take care to avoid divergence.

2.Recent years have witnessed a sound development momentum in bilateral ties with fruitful pragmatic cooperation in all areas.

3.The important point is that each side of the transatlantic partnership is capable of shouldering its part of the problems and is ready to act in close harmony with the other.

4.This is far more demanding than it sounds and now is the time to do it because we are in a period of innovation and change.

5.Despite some steps toward peace, the conflict between Israelis and Arabs continued to play a significant role in regional and worldwide relations.

6.This progress in negotiations improved relations between Israel and many Arab countries, including Jordan, which signed a peace agreement with Israel in 1994. 7.High food prices added to the difficulties of the global poverty reduction efforts and affected regional stability.

8.China's period of strategic opportunities is nothing but an international environment and evolutionary process where world peace is maintained and common development promoted.

9.The United States continues to have an interest in the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question and expects that the Taiwan question will be settled peacefully by the Chinese themselves.

10.A developed, strong and prosperous China will pose no threat to anyone. It will only promote world peace, stability and development.

答案

1.當(dāng)我們考慮已經(jīng)存在20余年的體制的投資策略時(shí)，我們得小心謹(jǐn)慎避免分歧。

2.近年來，兩國關(guān)系保持良好發(fā)展勢(shì)頭，各領(lǐng)域務(wù)實(shí)合作，成果豐碩。

3.重要的是，大西洋兩岸雙方能夠肩負(fù)起各自應(yīng)負(fù)的責(zé)任，并準(zhǔn)備與對(duì)方密切協(xié)作。

4.這要比聽起來艱巨得多，現(xiàn)在是行動(dòng)的時(shí)候了，因?yàn)槲覀冋幵诟镄屡c變革的時(shí)代。

5.盡管和平取得了一些進(jìn)展，但是以色列和阿拉伯國家之間的沖突依然在地區(qū)及世界關(guān)系中有著重要影響。

6.和談的進(jìn)展改善了以色列與很多阿拉伯國家之間的關(guān)系，其中也包括約旦，它曾于1994年與以色列簽訂了一項(xiàng)和平協(xié)議。

7.高糧價(jià)加大了全球減貧壓力，影響了地區(qū)穩(wěn)定。

8.中國的戰(zhàn)略機(jī)遇期，就是世界和平得到維護(hù)、共同發(fā)展得到推進(jìn)的國際環(huán)境和歷史進(jìn)程。

9.美國仍對(duì)和平解決中國臺(tái)灣問題保持關(guān)注，并期望中國人民能夠自己和平解決中國臺(tái)灣問題。

10.中國的發(fā)展、強(qiáng)盛和繁榮不會(huì)對(duì)任何人構(gòu)成威脅，而只會(huì)促進(jìn)世界的和平、穩(wěn)定和發(fā)展。